Massive state investment in quantum computing and communication raises alarms about the resilience of Western encryption and critical infrastructure.
A new analysis in Asia Times argues that China’s rapid advance in quantum technologies may become an “asymmetric wild card” in military power, with particular implications for US nuclear deterrence and digital infrastructure. The article, published 8 December, synthesises recent reporting and expert commentary on Beijing’s expanding quantum ambitions.
Citing Nikkei Asia, the piece notes that China is planning a state-backed “hard technology” fund worth around 1 trillion renminbi (roughly $140 billion), with quantum computing high on the priority list. The strategic objective is to be ahead of rivals by the 2030s—often labelled “Q-Day”—when large-scale, error-corrected quantum computers could potentially break widely used public-key encryption schemes such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography.
Experts interviewed in the article paint stark scenarios. Jesse Van Griensven of EigenQ suggests that sufficiently powerful quantum machines could, in principle, disable airports, power grids and military command networks by rapidly cracking encryption and disrupting secure communications, pushing an adversary “back to the Stone Age” without firing kinetic weapons. Ryan Fedasiuk of the American Enterprise Institute warns that China’s long-running strategy of “harvest now, decrypt later”—stealing encrypted data today and storing it until quantum decryption is possible—could allow retrospective access to decades of sensitive intelligence if Beijing reaches fault-tolerant quantum computing first and Western states lag in deploying post-quantum cryptography.
At the same time, China is aggressively rolling out quantum communication and QKD networks to protect its own systems. Large-scale pilot networks already link major cities, and the country has demonstrated satellite-based QKD experiments, giving it both a stronger defensive posture and valuable operational experience. While current quantum systems remain noisy and limited, analysts quoted in the article argue that the first nation to deploy robust, error-corrected quantum computers could gain unprecedented access to rivals’ secrets, transforming the calculus of deterrence and crisis stability.
Conclusions
The Asia Times piece concludes that quantum technology is becoming a central axis of strategic competition, not just a scientific curiosity. For the US and its allies, the lesson is twofold: accelerate the roll-out of quantum-safe cryptography across military and civilian networks, and invest in competitive quantum ecosystems of their own. For China, the quantum push is framed as a way to bypass traditional military disadvantages and reshape the strategic map of the Pacific. Either way, the article underlines that decisions made in the next few years—on funding, standards and security migration—will echo across the entire nuclear and cyber-security order.
